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Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008) document that aggregate skilled hours and
employment both became more volatile after the mid-1980s, in contrast to the si-
multaneous volatility decline of most aggregates, including overall hours and em-
ployment and unskilled hours and employment. In chapter 1, I propose that rising
efficiency in matching skilled workers to vacancies accounts for this change. The rise
of general-purpose information technology made the skills of well-educated workers
more transferable across firms and industries, and this increased the suitability of
unemployed skilled workers for a broader range of job vacancies. In turn this im-
plies a larger increase in the flow of skilled labor into employment during economic
booms. This causes skilled aggregates to be more volatile. I embed a simple search
and matching mechanism in a typical dynamic general equilibrium model to demon-
strate this idea.
The purpose of chapter 2 is to explore the contribution of capital-skill comple-
mentarity to short-run employment fluctuations. Given that such complementarity
is a leading explanation for long-run changes in the skill premium, it is interesting
to check its short-run implications for employment volatility. The numerical results
show that complementarity can make skilled employment more volatile than the
unskilled, but it can not improve standard DSGE models’ implications for overall
labor market’ volatility.
TWO ESSAYS IN MACROECONOMICS
by
Dong Wu
Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment













To my parents for their consistent support and understanding
ii
Table of Contents
1 Matching Efficiency and Skilled Employment Volatility 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Empirical Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Model Set-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3.1 Household . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3.2 Firm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3.3 Matching Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.3.4 Maximization Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.3.5 Nash Bargaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.3.6 Competitive Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.4 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.4.1 Parameters in the Utility Function: β, σs, σu, ηs, ηu, λs, λu, ls, lu 23
1.4.2 Parameters for the Production Sector: α, σ, δ, as, au, fs, fu . . . 24
1.4.3 Parameters for the Matching process: χs, χu, φs, φu, αs, αu . . . 25
1.4.4 Parameters for the Exogenous Process: ρz, σz . . . . . . . . . 27
1.5 Numerical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.5.1 Simulation I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.5.2 Simulation II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2 Capital-Skill Complementarity and Employment Volatility
Over the Business Cycle 38
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.2 Empirical Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.2.1 MORG dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.2.2 NIPA data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.3 The Benchmark Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.3.1 The Household . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.3.2 The Firm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.3.3 Competitive Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.4 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.4.1 Parameters in the Utility Function: β, σs, σu, ηs, ηu, λs, λu, χs, χu,
ls, lu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.4.2 Parameters for the Production Sector: αks, θ1, θ2, as, au, δs, δe . 56
2.4.3 Parameters for the Exogenous Process: ρz, σz . . . . . . . . . 57
2.4.4 Parameters for Control Models: αk, θ3, δ, ρq, σq . . . . . . . . . 57
2.5 Numerical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.5.1 Volatility Ratio of Skilled and Unskilled Employment . . . . . 60
2.5.2 Volatility Ratio of Employment to Output . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.5.3 Investment-Specific Shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
iii
A MORG Data 81
A.1 Sample Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
A.2 Demographic Subgroups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
A.3 Aggregation across Demographic Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
A.3.1 Aggregate Weights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
A.3.2 Hours in Efficiency Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
B Derivation of Wage Rates Resulting from Nash-Bargaining 84
C Equivalent Model Set-Up 87




Matching Efficiency and Skilled Employment Volatility
1.1 Introduction
Conventional wisdom holds that skilled workers are less likely to be laid off
during recessions and that skilled employment should be less volatile than its un-
skilled counterpart.1 However, this was not the case in the U.S. beginning in the
mid-1980s. Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008) present evidence that aggregate skilled
hours and employment became at least as volatile as unskilled measures starting in
the mid-1980s. One striking fact in their paper is that the standard deviation of the
cyclical component of skilled aggregates increased in contrast to the simultaneous
volatility decline of most macroeconomic aggregates, including total hours and em-
ployment. Thus, what happened to skilled workers? Why didn’t skilled volatility
decline?
I propose that rising efficiency in the labor matching process for skilled workers
accounts for the change in relative volatility. Rising efficiency in the search process
means that more unemployed workers get out of unemployment per unit of time
for a given number of unemployed workers and vacancies. Specifically, in economic
1Following the labor literature’s convention, I proxy the concept of skill with education. Specif-
ically, a worker is counted as skilled if she has a college degree or higher. Otherwise, she is regarded
as unskilled.
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booms, increased matching efficiency leads to a larger number of vacancies filled,
and thus employment expands more than before. The adoption and implementa-
tion of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is my explanation for
why search efficiency increased. One defining feature of ICT is that it lowers the
specificity of human capital. When ICT is widely implemented in various industries,
its standardization properties translate into a greater transferability of employee’s
skills across firms, industries and sectors of the economy.2 Given that recent tech-
nology advance has been skill-biased, ICT affects matching efficiencies of the skilled
and unskilled asymmetrically. ICT implies that skilled workers, when searching for
jobs, face more suitable positions to apply for than before, which is not true for
unskilled labor.
To make my idea clear, I embed a simple search and matching mechanism
in an otherwise typical dynamic general equilibrium model. Search frictions allow
vacancies and unemployment to co-exist. To capture the mechanism mentioned in
the previous paragraph, I assume that the skilled and unskilled go through separate
matching processes. To model matching efficiency in the labor market, I adopt a
labor-vacancy matching function derived from the classic urn-ball framework. I add
one feature to this standard scenario and enrich the matching function to embody
the fact that the proportion of unemployed workers suitable for a particular vacancy
2Kambourov and Manovskii (2008) document the rising trends in occupation and industry mo-
bility between 1968 and 1993. In addition to its impact on transferability of skills, the development
of ICT makes it easier for skilled employees to search for jobs nationwide, such that geographic
distance becomes a smaller factor when it comes to job application.
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can change over time. The intuition of this feature is simple. Prior to the spread
of ICT, human capital is firm-specific or job-specific. When firms post vacancies,
only a small portion of the unemployed meet the position’s requirements. This
causes low matching rates. However, matching efficiency increases following wide
implementation of ICT. ICT adoption causes the platform and working interface
to become standardized, so that most of a skilled worker’s existing knowledge con-
tinues to be effective in a new job. When a skilled worker is looking for job, her
previous expertise satisfies the requirements of more vacancies than before, which
dramatically increases the number of matches. Technically, for each type of worker,
the matching function has a parameter governing the fraction of workers suitable
for each associated vacancy. This parameter is related to matching efficiency and is
assumed to have increased over time for skilled workers.
Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008) show that changes in capital-skill complemen-
tarity can account for most of the changes in relative volatility in the labor market.
This paper identifies another mechanism that can explain the volatility increase in
skilled employment. Apparently, these two hypotheses are competing. Both hy-
potheses emphasize the impact of technology advance on the cyclical behavior of
employment. The Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008) explanation relies on the com-
parative advantage of skilled labor in adopting new technology. They argue that
the end of technology diffusion reduces capital-skill complementarity. Once new
equipment is widely used in the economy, skilled workers gradually lose their advan-
tage in implementing new technology. Thus, complementarity falls and volatility of
skilled employment rises. I argue, instead, that the general purpose feature of ICT
3
expedites the standardization of production, making previously accumulated skills
more transferable over jobs, firms and industries. The growing relevance of skill
in the search process enlarges the possibility of matching workers with vacancies.
Thus, economic booms witness a bigger swing in employment. In my opinion, the
distinction between these hypotheses lies in the fact that Castro and Coen-Pirani
(2008) and I focus on different aspects of technology. It is likely that these two
mechanisms are complementary.
Broadly speaking, this paper is part of the literature on the relationship be-
tween technological change and the labor market. There is a growing literature on
technology and skill premia. The difference between this paper and others is that I
pay particular attention to the general-purpose nature of ICT. Bresnahan and Tra-
jtenberg (1995) coined the term ”General Purpose Technology” (GPT) to describe
widely used technologies that transform both household life and the ways that firms
conduct business. Examples are steam, electricity, internal combustion and ICT.3
The existing skill premia literature centers on skill-biased technological change as
an explanation for rising wage inequality due to changing wage differentials among
different education levels.4 Katz and Murphy (1992) and Acemoglu (1998,1999)
propose that new equipment goods have improved the productivity of workers with
3Jovanovic and Rousseau (2005) present various stylized facts of GPT.
4There are exceptions. For example, Di Nardo et al (1996) and Lee (1999) hold that institutional
changes, such as deunionization and the decline in the real minimum wage, play an important role
in explaining changes in the wage premium. Wood (1995) claims that rising inequality is partly
due to trade liberalization. For a comprehensive survey for this topic, see Acemoglu (2002) and
Autor, Katz and Kearney (2005).
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certain skills. Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull and Violante (2000, henceforth KORV)
show that capital-skill complementarity can explain the upward trend of the skill
premium. Many economists argue that capital-embodied technology generates an
increase in demand of skilled labor because skilled workers have a comparative ad-
vantage in adopting new equipment. When there is an acceleration in the speed
of embodied technical change, the demand for skilled labor increases accordingly.
Galor and Tsiddon (1997), Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) and Galor and Moav
(2000) follow this argument. All these papers explore changes in relative prices of
labor from the perspective of skill-biased technological progress. Instead, I turn
attention to the quantity side of the labor market and analyze the implications
of the general-purpose nature of ICT for employment volatility of different worker
types. Aghion, Howitt and Violante (2002) have pointed out the importance of the
general-purpose nature of ICT for the labor market, although they emphasize its
implications for wage inequality rather than employment volatility.
This paper also draws on the labor search and matching literature. The search
and matching model has become the workhorse in macroeconomic theories of the
labor market. Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) provide an attractive mechanism
generating equilibrium unemployment, which has been adopted to study various
labor market issues. In this paper, I embed the search and matching process into
an otherwise classical dynamic general equilibrium model.5 I do not use the typical
5Shimer (2005) illustrates that the introduction of the search and matching function does not
magnify employment volatility in the benchmark DSGE model. Shimer (2009) redefines this issue
as the labor-wedge puzzle. My model also generates low volatilities for the labor market.
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Cobb-Douglas matching function although it has properties consistent with many
empirical results. The main reason is that the Cobb-Douglas matching function
lacks micro-foundations and therefore its parameters do not have direct economic
interpretations. I derive a simple matching function based on the urn-ball framework
in which parameters have direct economic meanings.6
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents empirical evidence on
changes in employment volatility of skilled and unskilled workers in the U.S. Section
3 sets up the search and matching framework in a typical dynamic general equilib-
rium environment. Section 4 calibrates the parameters of the model and the analysis
of numerical results is in section 5. Section 6 discusses alternative explanations for
changes in the cyclical dynamics of the labor market, and section 7 summarizes the
paper.
1.2 Empirical Observations
In this section, I re-produce the two main stylized labor market facts presented
in Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008). First, the volatilities of skilled hours and em-
ployment increased beginning in the mid-1980s while those of the unskilled declined.
If we take into account the simultaneous change in overall economic volatility, the
pattern of relative employment volatility becomes quite remarkable. Secondly, the
volatility of hours worked is primarily driven by that of employment. This result
motivates my focus on the behavior of employment in my theoretical model.
6Other papers have also attemped to enrich the matching function by offering a micro-
foundation. A comprehensive survey is Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
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For the labor market measures, I rely on the CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation
Group (MORG) dataset. I also use real GDP from NIPA. Following Castro and
Coen-Pirani (2008), the time period of my sample is from 1979q1 to 2003q4. The
MORG dataset is compiled by the NBER from extracts of the monthly CPS and
contains data on weekly hours and earnings. Specifically, the original CPS outgoing
rotation group data are recorded each month, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics
extracts about 25,000 records of those outgoing households per month and assigns
each household a weight such that aggregate statistics are representative of the U.S.
population. One advantage of this dataset is that it contains comprehensive infor-
mation, including weekly earnings. Earnings can be used to calculate wage weights,
which are useful in controlling for composition effects when hours are aggregated
across different demographic groups.
I follow standard sample-selection criteria to handle missing observations and
coding errors and restrict attention to individuals in the labor force between 16 and
65 years of age that are not self-employed. I then convert monthly series into quar-
terly data. I have about 45,000 observations per quarter, of which on average about
11,000 hold at least a college degree. Variables constructed from the MORG data
include total hours in efficiency units, employment in efficiency units and employ-
ment. These statistics are computed for all workers, and for skilled and unskilled
labor respectively. To compute labor aggregates in efficiency units, real average
wages for each demographic group are used as weights when aggregating across 240
subgroups. This method is analogous to the efficiency units approach suggested by
Katz and Murphy (1992), KORV(2000), and Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008).
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The main variables of interest are constructed as follows:7
Hours Worked in Efficiency Units: Using the efficiency units approach to con-
trol for the counter-cyclical dynamics of labor force quality, I construct a set of
time-invariant weights for each demographic group. First, I divide the sample into
240 demographic groups based on age, sex, race and education. Second, I sum
up weekly earnings and hours worked in each subgroup assuming that individuals
within each subgroup are perfect substitutes. Next, a measure of the nominal wage
rate is created by dividing total income by total hours within each group. As in
Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008), I use the average real wages to weight hours worked
across different groups.8
Employment: Aggregate employment in any given quarter is the total number
of individuals, weighted with the CPS associated weights, who report being at work
that quarter.9 I compute this statistic for the entire labor force, and for skilled
and unskilled labor. For the whole sample period, the average employment rate is
94%; the average skilled employment rate—defined as the ratio of the level of skilled
employment to the entire labor force—is 23%; and the average unskilled rate, defined
in a parallel way, is 71%.
7See Appendix A for details.
8I use the “CPI index for all urban consumers” from the BLS as the denominator when com-
puting real wages.
9The MORG dataset contains several weights for different purposes. Following convention, I
use “earning weight for all races” to get nationwide statistics for workers of different education
levels. Notice that these CPS weights are not the same as the wage weights I construct to measure
variables in efficiency units.
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Employment in Efficiency Units: I use the same efficiency units approach dis-
cussed above for hours to construct employment efficiency unit aggregates.10
These time series from the MORG dataset display strong seasonality. Before
any further data analysis, I need to deseasonalize them. The conventional way is
to use the Census Bureau’s seasonal adjustment program X12. Castro and Coen-
Pirani (2008) claim that measurement errors also produce high frequency noise in
these series. Following their practice, I apply a centered five-quarter moving average
to these X12-adjusted series. I then log them and extract the cyclical component
using a Hodrick-Prescott filter with a parameter of 1600. Volatility or variability is
defined as the standard deviation of this cyclical component.
In Figure 1.1, I present the rolling standard deviations of GDP and hours in
efficiency units of the skilled and unskilled, while Figure 1.2 demonstrates those for
real GDP and skilled and unskilled employment.11 For quarter t, I compute the
standard deviation of the cyclical component of these variables using observations
from period t to t + 40. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 display roughly the same patterns for
hours and employment. Around the mid-1980s, the standard deviations of GDP
and unskilled hours and employment decline sharply. By contrast, the volatility
of skilled labor climbs over this period. A growing literature, reviewed by Stock
and Watson (2003), has documented that the volatilities of most macro aggregates
declined substantially starting in the mid-1980s. Clearly, skilled labor is one ex-
10In my calibration below, these weighted aggregates are used to compute the type-specific
production weights for each type of worker.
11Please note that employment in Figure 1.2 is not in efficiency units.
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ception. To display the differences between skilled and unskilled labor more clearly,
Figure 1.3 shows the rolling standard deviations of skilled and unskilled employment
relative to that of GDP. The ratio for the unskilled is roughly flat while the skilled
ratio increases. This graph conveys a strong message that something fundamental
in the labor market changed in the past three decades.
McConnell and Perez-Quiroz (2000) estimate the break date of aggregate
volatility to be 1984q1. Accordingly, I divide the sample into two sub-periods:
one from 1979q1 to 1983q4, and the other from 1984q1 to 2003q4.12 For each sub-
period, I compute the cyclical statistics of skilled and unskilled labor. Table 1.1
shows the same pattern as Figures 1.1 and 1.2. The standard deviations of skilled
and unskilled labor change in opposite directions. In addition, Table 1.2 illustrates
that a large proportion of fluctuations of hours results from employment regardless
of skill level and period. To prove that the increased volatility of skilled aggregates is
not an artifact of aggregation, Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008) rule out composition
effects from sector, occupation and gender as explanations for the changing relative
volatility of skilled and unskilled labor.
12One concern is that the first subperiod is so short that it cannot illustrate clearly the cyclical
dynamics of the labor market. To correct this shortcoming of MORG dataset, Castro and Coen-




Two types of economic agents co-exist in the model economy: one representa-
tive household, consisting of a continuum of infinitely-lived individuals who consume,
search for jobs and supply labor in order to maximize discounted expected utility;
and one representative firm, which uses labor and capital to maximize the expected
discounted value of profit. There are three types of factor inputs: capital, skilled and
unskilled labor. There are two technologies: one for matching unemployed workers
seeking new jobs to vacancies posted by firms, the other for producing consumption
goods using capital and labor inputs. Finally, the model economy contains one ex-
ogenous shock affecting total factor productivity. Time is discrete and is denoted
by t = 0, 1, 2, · · · .
1.3.1 Household
There is a representative household that includes a continuum of members
with measure 1. Individuals are divided into two types: skilled or unskilled. These
two types of workers go through different search and matching processes and enjoy
different consumption paths.13 The household acts as a social planner, maximizing
the aggregate household utility by optimally allocating consumption goods among
13In the model economy, skilled and unskilled workers have different consumption because of the
differences in their utility weights in the preference function. However, all workers of a given type
enjoy the same amount of consumption regardless of employment status. This assumption seems
realistic given that in the real economy consumption is different for workers of various education
levels.
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household members. The utility level depends on consumption and disutility from
employment. The aggregate utility function is the weighted sum of the utilities of
skilled and unskilled labor. The household optimally equalizes the marginal utility
of consumption within household members of the same type, and also equalizes the
weighted marginal utility of consumption across the two types of individuals. The




















where the subscript “s” is related to skilled labor, while “u” represents unskilled
workers. β is the subjective discount factor; λi, i ∈ {s, u} is the subjective utility
weight; li is the measure of each type of worker in the labor force, where ls+lu = 1;
14
cit is consumption for type-i workers at period t; nit is the measure of employment for
each type of worker; and uit is the corresponding unemployment measure at period t,
where li = nit+uit. I assume that the household is able to insure its members against
all idiosyncratic shocks, mimicking the complete markets allocation. Because utility
is separable in consumption and leisure, all members of a given type of labor enjoy
the same consumption regardless of their employment status.
The household chooses consumption for its members subject to:
0 = Dt + wstnst + wutnut + ptqt − ptqt+1 − lscst − lucut
where Dt is the dividend received by the household at period t; wit is the state-
contingent wage rate for type-i workers in period t, which is determined by Nash
bargaining; pt is the price per share at period t; qt is the number of shares in
14I abstract from the labor-force participation decision in this paper.
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the representative firm held by the representative household at the end of period
t − 1 and qt+1 is the number of shares carried over to period t + 1. Due to the
representative-agent assumption, the household is the only owner of the firm, which
implies qt = qt+1 at the aggregate level. Accordingly, the above budget equation in
equilibrium becomes:
0 = Dt + wstnst + wutnut − lscst − lucut (1.2)
The two types of workers go through separate matching processes. The laws
of motion for labor flows are expressed as follows:
nst+1 = (1− χs)nst +Ms(ust, vst) (1.3)
nut+1 = (1− χu)nut +Mu(uut, vut) (1.4)
where χi, i ∈ {s, u} represents the type-specific separation rate; Mi is the matching
function for each type of worker; and vit is the type-specific vacancies posted by
firms at period t. In the model economy, there is involuntary unemployment due to
labor market frictions. Each period all unemployed workers search for new jobs, but
the amount of job creation is also dependent on the number of vacancies posted.
1.3.2 Firm
The representative firm has access to a production function using one type
of capital and two types of labor as inputs. I assume that the numbers of skilled
and unskilled workers in the population are exogenously determined and there is no
channel for an unskilled worker to upgrade her skill. The empirical labor literature,
13
such as Katz and Autor (1999) and Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998), documents
that skilled and unskilled workers are not perfect substitutes and that the elasticity
of substitution between them is between 1 and 2, well short of infinity. Accordingly,









where zt is the shock to general TFP; k is the capital stock; the elasticity of sub-
stitution between two types of workers is 1
1−σ ; and ai is the type-specific weight in
production. The firm is assumed to own capital, but has to employ labor from the
household. To hire labor, the firm posts vacancies and goes through the matching

















σ − wstnst − wutnut − fsvst − fuvut + (1− δ)kt − kt+1
Λ0,t is the stochastic discount factor of the household while Dt is the dividends. fi
is the unit cost of vacancy posting for type-i jobs, and δ is the depreciation rate of
15See Andolfatto (1996) for this type of set-up. In Appendix C, I derive an alternative set-up










capital. The recursive expression for the above problem is :










σ − wstnst − wutnut
− fsvst − fuvut + (1− δ)kt − kt+1 + βEtΛt,t+1J(t+ 1|t)
}
(1.7)
Each period, the firm optimally decides how many vacancies to post for a given
type of labor and how much to invest in capital for future production. Because labor
supply, like capital, is determined one period in advance, the firm faces the labor-
matching constraints:
nst+1 = (1− χs)nst +Ms(ust, vst)
nut+1 = (1− χu)nut +Mu(uut, vut)
1.3.3 Matching Function
In this subsection, I derive a matching function based on an “urn-ball” frame-
work. The aggregate matching function encapsulates search and matching frictions.
The sources of frictions in the labor market are various, including co-ordination
failures, mismatch and limited mobility. One reason why the Cobb-Douglas match-
ing function is so popular is that its constant-returns-to-scale property is consistent
with empirical outcomes.16 However, this form of matching function looks like a
black box, which limits the interpretation of both empirical and theoretical results.
Moreover, this matching function is so abstract that certain features pertaining to
the labor market cannot be added easily.
16See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
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Some existing research has attempted to establish micro-foundations for the
matching function, in hopes of gaining a better understanding of the nature of
matching frictions, and providing direct economic meanings for function parameters.
The exponential-type matching function was first employed in a market context by
Butters (1977), in which buyers and sellers contact each other in commodity markets.
In the typical static “urn-ball” scenario, unemployed workers each place a ball
(job application) randomly in an urn (job-vacancy), where each urn belongs to one
firm. Firms then pick one ball from their urn at random. In this model, matching
frictions come from co-ordination failure between workers. For example, some urns
may contain more than one ball while some others have nothing in them. The
possibility of a given urn having at least one ball is
(




, where u is is
the number of balls and v is the number of urns. If the number of urns, v, goes to













In fact, Hall (1980), Pissarides (1979) and Peter (1984) all obtain similar forms for









which represents the expected number of urns (vacancies) receiving at least one
application in a time period of length dt.17
17Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) enrich the continuous-time version by incorporating simulta-
16
Equation (1.8) satisfies intuitive properties of the matching function. For ex-
ample, the number of matches is increasing in both arguments; M(0, v) = M(u, 0) =
0; and returns to scale are constant. Furthermore, the urn-ball framework can eas-
ily accomadate additional features, making the matching function more flexible and
meaningful. Moreover, there are several papers, such as Montgomery (1991), Cao
and Shi (2000), Julien et al (2000) and Burdett et al (2001), which model a trade-off
facing agents between high match payoffs and the risk of not matching and generate
an exponential equilibrium matching function in the limit.
To adapt the urn-ball scenario to my model economy, I assume that only a
fraction αi of unemployed workers of type i are qualified for a given vacancy.
18 As
mentioned before, I assume that skilled and unskilled workers go through different
search processes. Specifically, I assume that there are two labor markets, one for
the skilled and the other for the unskilled. Each urn accepts only one type of
application and is placed at the associated marketplace. Each type of worker goes
to the corresponding labor market and tries her luck. Workers randomly put their
balls in one urn without knowledge about their qualification for that particular urn.
Firms can’t identify ex ante which workers in the market are qualified when workers
place balls, but firms know the fraction of unemployed workers in the market that are
suitable, and this is constant over vacancies within a given market. Therefore, the










dt = fu+ gv, where f, g are parameters.
18For notation, I use αi in this subsection and i ∈ {s, u}. In the subsequent subsections, αs
and αu are used to represent the suitability of each type of worker to the associated vacancy,
respectively.
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Based on this argument, it follows that the value of αi is expected to fall between 0
and 1 in the discrete time formulation. In this paper, equation (1.10) is adopted as
the matching function.
I can derive the same matching function in the continuous-time context. I
assume that λi, the arrival rate of the Poisson process, is positively related to αiui,
the number of unemployed workers of type i who are qualified for the job, and is















, where dt = 1.
1.3.4 Maximization Problem
For the household, the maximization problem can be expressed as:





















0 = Dt + wstnst + wutnut + ptqt − ptqt+1 − lscst − lucut (1.11)







Equation (1.12) shows that the household equalizes weighted marginal utilities of
consumption across skilled and unskilled labor.
For the firm, the profit-maximizing problem is characterized as:










σ − wstnst − wutnut
− fsvst − fuvut + (1− δ)kt − kt+1 + βEtΛt,t+1J(t+ 1|t)
}
(P.2)

























σ + 1− δ
}
In equilibrium, the cost of investing one unit of capital this period is equal to the
expected value of the marginal product and the undepreciated portion of the capital
next period.
These two agents interact with each other through two channels. One is
through the labor market where the firm hires household members and pays wages
for their work. The other is through the securities market. Household members
hold the securities issued by the firm and receive dividends contingent on the state




At the start of each period, the household and firm bargain with one another
over the skilled and unskilled wage rates after the productivity shock is realized. I
assume that agents implement the axiomatic Nash bargaining solution from Nash









where i ∈ {s, u} indicates skilled or unskilled workers. Following Shimer (2009), Ṽit
represents the marginal utility to the household of having one more type-i worker
employed at a wage w̃i in period t rather than unemployed, evaluated at the equi-
librium levels of assets and employment.20 Meanwhile, J̃it is the marginal profit to
the firm of hiring one more type-i worker at a wage w̃i in period t, and φi is the
bargaining weight of type-i workers vis-a-vis the firm.
The equilibrium wage rate w̃i solves the weighted geometric average of the
gains from bargaining:














19w̃i is the type-specific arbitrary wage rate in the Nash bargaining context at period t. To
simplify notation, I suppress the time-subscript ‘t’. In equilibrium, w̃i = wit.
20Some papers also incorporate rigid wages. If rigid wages are added to this bargaining frame-
work, as in Hall (2005), wages will be the weighted sum of the current Nash-Bargaining solution
and previous wages. This mechanism is designed to dampen the cyclical fluctuations of wages and
to increase the volatility of employment.
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The wage formula is a linear combination of the marginal product of labor (MPL)
and the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between consumption and employment
from the perspective of the household. The combination weights are the associated
bargaining powers. Because MPL and MRS are both pro-cyclical, the wage rates
are pro-cyclical and thus absorb most of the fluctuations of the exogenous shocks.
As a result, the volatility of employment is quite low compared to output, as in
most similar search models. Given that this paper does not focus on the solution to
the Shimer (2005) puzzle, I abstract from this issue and concentrate on the relative
volatilities of skilled and unskilled employment in the model.
1.3.6 Competitive Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium is now formulated. The equilibrium results from
the combination of the household’s utility-maximizing and the firm’s profit-optimizing
problems. That is, the household solves problem (P.1) and the firm chooses optimal
strategies for problem (P.2).
The aggregate state of the model economy is SSt = {zt, kt, nst, nut} for period
t. In equilibrium, the wages wst and wut are functions of the state of the economy:
21Please check Appendix B for the detailed derivation.
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wst = Ws(SSt), wut = Wu(SSt). While skilled and unskilled employment and capital
evolve according to nst+1 = Ns(SSt), nut+1 = Nu(SSt), kt+1 = K(SSt).
A competitive equilibrium is a set of allocation rules, prices and aggregate
laws of motion for the state variables that satisfy:
1. The household maximizes (P.1), taking as given the aggregate state SSt and
the pricing functions, Ws, and Wu. The household’s solution is: cst = Cs(SSt),
cut = Cu(SSt);
2. The firm solves (P.2), given SSt, Ws, and Wu. Its solution is: nst+1 = Ns(SSt),
nut+1 = Nu(SSt), kt+1 = K(SSt), vst = Vs(SSt), vut = Vu(SSt);







σ + kt(1− δ) = kt+1 + lscst + lucut + fsvst + fuvut
1.4 Calibration
To proceed further, I calibrate the model economy in this section. First, some
structural parameters are assigned values according to previous literature. Then,
given these borrowed parameters, all other parameters are set so that the model
matches certain stylized facts in the U.S. data. These unknown parameters govern
the utility function, production sector, search and matching process, and exogenous
technology process.
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1.4.1 Parameters in the Utility Function: β, σs, σu, ηs, ηu, λs, λu, ls, lu
The subjective discount factor is set to match an annual rate of return of 5
percent. Given that the time period is set to one month, β is equal to 0.996.
The coefficient of relative risk-aversion, σi, i ∈ {s, u}, displays a wide range of
estimates in existing literature. For example, using durable and non-durable goods,
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) estimate σi to be 0.16. Hall (1988) and Attanasio
and Weber (1993) find σi to be around 3 using aggregate consumption data. Fuhrer
(2000) estimates σi to be about 6 assuming habit formation in consumption. All
these estimates regard individuals as identical while I have divided labor into two
subgroups. I set σs = σu = 1, which is within the range of existing estimates. Thus,
the consumption part of the utility function takes the log form.
ηs and ηu index the marginal disutilities for the representative household of
skilled and unskilled employment, respectively. If I assume that each type of worker
works a fixed number of hours per period, then ηs and ηu also govern the Frisch
elasticities for the household of skilled and unskilled hours. Empirical estimates of
this elasticity for the entire labor force have a wide range. MaCurdy (1981), Altonji
(1986) and Browning, Deaton and Irish (1985) find elasticities between 0 and 0.5.
Browning, Hansen and Heckman (1999) report estimates ranging from 0.5 to 1.6.
Imai and Keane (2004) provide a high estimate of 3.8. In the benchmark version
of my model, I set the elasticity to 0.5, implying ηs = ηu = 2, to make sure that
the marginal disutilities of skilled and unskilled employment fall within a reasonable
range. Again, I abstract from differences in this elasticity between the two types of
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workers. I check the robustness of numerical results to the values of ηs and ηu.
λs and λu are subjective weights of skilled and unskilled workers in the house-
hold utility. I set λs and λu to make sure that the steady state consumption ratio
between skilled and unskilled labor is consistent with its empirical counterpart.22
The Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) dataset collects “total average annual
expenditure” by education level since 1996. The average consumption ratio in the
data is 1.67.
ls and lu are set to match the labor force shares of skilled and unskilled workers.
Both of them are treated as exogenous values in my paper. For simulation II, these
two values vary between two sub-periods.
1.4.2 Parameters for the Production Sector: α, σ, δ, as, au, fs, fu
α is the capital share of total income. I follow convention and set α to 0.35.
σ governs the elasticity of substitution between two types of workers, for which the
existing literature has a wide range of estimates. Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998)
conclude that the elasticity of substitution is likely to fall into the interval between
1 and 2. Katz and Murphy (1992) estimate the elasticity as 1.4. In the benchmark
version, I set σ = 0.29, corresponding to an elasticity 1
1−σ = 1.4. In subsequent
sections, I check the robustness of numerical results to other values of σ.
For the depreciation rate, I follow Shimer (2009) and use data from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis. BEA’s Fixed Asset Table reports the current cost net stock
22In the model economy, all workers of a given type optimallly consume the same amount.
However, different type workers can consume different amounts at an optimum.
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of fixed assets and consumer durables, which is used as a measure of the nominal
capital stock. I get nominal GDP from NIPA. The annual average capital-output
ratio in the US is 3.2, which implies that the ratio of capital to monthly output
is 38.3. The depreciation rate is set to 0.0055 in order to be consistent with this
ratio.23 This way of fixing the depreciation rate allows me to abstract from issues
such as the distinction between physical depreciation and economic depreciation.
as and au are type-specific production weights. The two types of workers
are neither perfect substitutes nor equally productive in production. Hence, as
and au are set to match the observed ratios of employment in efficiency units to
employment for both types of workers. For the whole sample period of 1979-2003,
the production weight for skilled workers is 12.58 while that for unskilled workers
7.28. In the following section, I normalize au to be 1 and set as = 12.58/7.28.
fs and fu are vacancy-posting costs, which are set to make sure that the steady-
state values of ns and nu are equal to their empirical counterparts, as described
further in section 1.5.
1.4.3 Parameters for the Matching process: χs, χu, φs, φu, αs, αu
To estimate the separation rates for skilled and unskilled workers, I follow
the method used in Shimer (2005) by inferring the job-finding rate first and then
23Alternatively, I can set the monthly depreciation rate to match the empirical counterpart and
then derive the associated capital stock. Although the steady-state values of the capital stock
obtained through these two approaches are different, they have quite negligible effects on the
cyclical dynamics of the model.
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computing the associated separation rate. The data are the basic monthly CPS
from 1994 to 2006. I choose January 1994 as the starting period because the CPS
survey switched to dependent interviewing at that time. Starting in 1994, respon-
dents who have been laid off in successive months were not asked for the duration
of their unemployment in the second month. This switch in survey methodology
reduced measures of short-term unemployment.24 In this paper, I first compute
the separation rates without any modification to the data. I get χs = 0.0108 and
χu = 0.0201. Next I scale separation rates up to match the separation rate of the
entire labor force in Shimer (2005) who adjusts his measure for the 1994 switch in
CPS survey methdology. The scaled-up estimates are χs = 0.0198 and χu = 0.0369.
I set χs = 0.0108 and χu = 0.0201 for the benchmark model in simulation I. For
robustness, I substitute the scaled-up separation rates and compute the associated
numerical results. Simulated results are robust to this change.
Hall (2005) shows that separation rates can be estimated through the Job
Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS), or directly from flows in the CPS.
Gottschalk and Moffitt (1998) directly compute separation rates from the Survey
of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). All these estimates demonstrate that
the separation rate is roughly constant over time and that recessions involve no
significant increases in the rate of departure from jobs. In sum, it is reasonable to
estimate the separation rate based on my abbreviated sample period and to keep
the separation rate fixed over time in the model economy.
Existing literature adopts different values for the bargaining power, φ. Shimer
24See Abraham and Shimer (2001).
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(2005) sets φ to 0.72 based on the Hosios’s (1990) efficiency condition, while Hage-
dorn and Manovskii (2008) use bargaining power along with other structural param-
eters to match the volatility of labor market quantities and find φ to be 0.05. In this
paper, I assume symmetric Nash-Bargaining power for both the skilled and unskilled,
namely φs = φu = 0.5. In fact, the wage rates in my model are a bargaining-power
weighted combination of MPL and MRS, both of which are pro-cyclical. As I show
later, my results are robust to different values of φs and φu.
The parameters αs and αu govern matching efficiency for skilled and unskilled
workers. These are key parameters in my model, and I discuss how I set them in
section 1.5.
1.4.4 Parameters for the Exogenous Process: ρz, σz
Shimer (2009) estimates the productivity shock’s properties by using the BLS
annual data on multifactor productivity growth, first calculating the average annual
growth rate, the unconditional standard deviation of annual productivity growth
and the annual autocorrelation, then deriving the implied monthly parameters. I
assume that the productivity shock has a deterministic trend and borrow ρz = 0.98
and σz = 0.005 from Shimer (2009).
Parameter values are listed in Table 1.3.
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1.5 Numerical Results
In this section, I solve the dynamic model numerically. I take first-order linear
approximations of optimal policy functions around steady-state values. To illustrate
my main mechanism in the model economy, I carry out two experimental simulations.
The first simulation aims to show the potential importance of matching efficiency
for employment volatility. Specifically, I use prior research or data moments to pin
down all parameter values except for αs, αu, fs, and fu, as described in the previous
section. I regard αs as a free parameter and allow its value to increase within a
reasonable range to represent improvement in matching efficiency for skilled workers
due to the spread of ICT. I assume αu to be 0.35 while fs and fu are adjusted in
response to changes in αs to guarantee that steady-state values of ns and nu are
consistent with the data. This experiment gives us a direct idea of the mechanism
at work in the model. Next, I undertake a disciplined exercise of simulating the
effects of changes in matching technology between two periods, 1979-1983 and 1984-
2003. I pin down parameters for each period using moments not related to skilled
employment volatility. I then show that the model can generate increased volatility
of skilled employment in the second period.
To obtain the summary statistics of interest, I simulate the model 3000 times
for each set of structural parameters. For each simulation, I set the number of
periods to be 360, corresponding to thirty years. I convert simulated monthly series
to quarterly data using 3-month averages. Finally, I calculate the standard deviation
of these percentage deviations from the steady state for variables of interest.
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1.5.1 Simulation I
In this paper, I propose that rising matching efficiency can account for the
increased volatility of skilled employment. In the model, the key parameter to this
mechanism is αs, governing the fraction of skilled unemployed workers suitable for
a given vacancy. My first simulation illustrates the positive relationship between
matching efficiency and employment volatility. To isolate this relationship from
others, I fix all parameters except for αs, fs and fu. In particular, I set αu to be
0.35 and assume it to be constant.25 My procedure is as follows: I choose a value
for αs, pin down fs and fu to make sure that ns and nu are consistent with their
empirical counterparts, simulate my model for this set of parameters and record
the volatilities of variables of interest. I repeat this process for a range of values
for αs. Results are shown in Figures 1.4 and 1.5. As αs increases, the volatility
of skilled employment rises relative to that of output, while the relative volatility
of unskilled employment remains flat. Other factors being controlled for, a more
efficient matching process makes skilled employment more volatile. Intuitively, rising
matching efficiency increases the number of matches in booms for a given number
of unemployed workers and vacancies. Therefore, skilled unemployed workers have
a higher job-finding rate, worker flows out of unemployment rise and employment
fluctuates more than before. Meanwhile, Figure 1.5 shows the impact of changes in
αs on the skill premium, defined as the average ratio of skilled to unskilled wages
implied by the model. The figure shows that increases in matching efficiency for
25The volatility pattern is robust to the value of αu.
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skilled workers generate a modest increase in the skill premium.
Several structural parameters calibrated above have a wide range of plausible
estimates. I check the robustness of numerical results to these parameters. I re-do
the exercise plotted in Figure 1.4 for values of the reverse labor supply elasticity,
ηs and ηu, ranging from 0.25 to 3; for values of σ, where
1
1−σ is the substitution
elasticity in production, ranging from 0.1 to 0.5; and for scaled-up separation rates,
namely χs = 0.0198 and χu = 0.369. The volatility pattern shown in Figure 1.4
is robust to these tests. I also explore robustness to alternative values of φs and
φu, which represent both the bargaining power and weights for wage determination.
Specifically, φi is the weight on the marginal product of type-i labor in wage deter-
mination, while 1−φi is the weight on the MRS between consumption and labor. In
the model economy, the volatility of the MRS is less than that of the MPL. When
the value of φi declines, wage fluctuations diminish accordingly. As a result, em-
ployment becomes more volatile. However, this does not affect the impact of αs on
the relative volatilities of skilled and unskilled employment.
1.5.2 Simulation II
Now that I have established that increased matching efficiency can potentially
explain higher volatility for skilled workers, the next step is to assess whether this
mechanism can potentially explain the observed rise in skilled volatility quantita-
tively. I calibrate the model to two subperiods, 1979-1983 and 1984-2003. Table 1.4
presents summary statistics on the labor market for these subperiods. Over time,
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the skilled share of the labor force increased at the expense of the unskilled share,
and the wage ratio between skilled and unskilled workers rose. I use these changes
to pin down parameters, and then examine the extent to which my calibrated model
reproduces the observed volatility changes between periods.
Specifically, for each period I allow αs, αu, fs, fu, λs, and λu to vary while all
other parameters are fixed at their values from simulation I. Note that αs and
αu govern matching efficiency for skilled and unskilled workers while fs and fu are
vacancy-posting costs. The first four parameters are set in each period to ensure that
the model economy matches the observed long-run averages of the skilled labor share




whose values for two subperiods are listed in Table 1.4.26 The last two parameters,
λs and λu, are subjective utility weights for skilled and unskilled workers, which are
set to guarantee that the consumption ratio is valid over changing periods.
Table 1.5 presents calibrated parameter values for each subperiod while Table
1.6 shows the simulated volatilities. Table 1.7 summarizes the volatility ratios of
skilled and unskilled employment relative to output implied by the simulation II and
compares them with the data. The last column of Table 1.7 shows that the model
economy generates a 50% rise in relative volatility of skilled employment, compared
to the 217% increase observed in the data.
Tables 1.5 and 1.6 show that the calibrated value of αs increases between peri-
26Note that lu = 1 − ls, us = ls − ns, uu = lu − nu. The values of ls and lu are directly
determined by the associated measures of skilled and unskilled labor. Also, both are treated as
exogenous parameters in the models.
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ods, representing a rise in matching efficiency for skilled workers; and that consistent
with the previous numerical results, employment volatility of the skilled goes up in
the later period. However, Table 1.5 also shows that the calibrated αu increases,
while Table 1.6 displays a negligible change in unskilled volatility. This seems to be
a challenge to my hypothesis: why does unskilled volatility not increase substan-
tially when αu goes up? My explanation is that there is a decline in the number
of unemployed unskilled workers in the labor force between periods. Note that the
number of matches of type-i workers is dependent on not only vacancies, vi, and
matching efficiency, αi, but also the amount of unemployment, ui. The increased
αi pushes the number of matches upward while the drop in ui pulls this number
down. On net, fewer unemployed unskilled workers get jobs in booms and unskilled
employment expands less in the later period. One might worry that this argument
concerns level changes while volatility depends on percentage deviations. Given the
accompanying decline in the share of the unskilled in the labor force, it is not clear
whether the decline in the level of unskilled unemployment is sufficient to prevent a
rise in unskilled volatility driven by rising matching efficiency. To clarify this issue, I
derive an approximate expression for employment volatility for type-i workers from
the law of motion for employment, which is a function of αi, the matching efficiency
of type i workers and the steady-state values of unemployment ūi, employment n̄i,











27See Appendix D for the detailed derivation.
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. In contrast to unskilled workers, the steady-state number of
unemployed skilled workers, ūs, remains roughly constant between periods while
matching efficiency of skilled workers increases. Therefore, the product of αsūs
increases substantially, leading to a volatility rise in skilled employment. In contrast,
unskilled workers have a decline in ūu, which offsets the effect of the rise of ᾱu.
Taking into account all relevant factors, these competing parameter changes for the
unskilled parameters roughly cancel each other out and the overall effect on unskilled
employment volatility is negligible.
Table 1.6 also documents the volatility of job-finding rates for skilled labor,
unskilled labor and the overall labor force in the two subperiods. The volatility of
the job-finding rate for skilled labor has a higher percentage increase in the second
period than that for unskilled labor.28
Next, I plot impulse responses to a favorable TFP shock to compare model
dynamics between the two periods. Each quadrant of Figure 1.6 contains two sets
of responses for a given variable, with the impulse responses for the second period
marked with crosses (“x”). In both periods, when the economy has a positive shock
to TFP, vacancies, job-finding rates and employment jump up for both types of
workers, which leads to a drop in unemployment. The response of vacancies is
28Elsby, Michaels and Solon (2009) study outflow rates from unemployment since WWII using
CPS data. They estimate job-finding rates using a variety of different methods. Their estimated
rates do not show an upward or downward trend. They do not study trends in volatility in these
rates, and they look at the overall labor force rather than skilled and unskilled workers separately.
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smaller in the second period than in the first period following a good shock, due to
the increased vacancy-posting cost. For skilled workers, the increase in matching
efficiency dominates the effect of lower vacancies, so skilled workers have a much
higher job finding rate in the later period, resulting in a larger percentage increase
in employment. For unskilled workers, the increase in the job-finding rate is only
slightly higher in the second period, because the lower vacancies almost completely
offset the increase in matching efficiency, and consequently the initial response of
unskilled employment is only slightly higher in the second period compared to the
early period.
Under my first order approximation, impulse responses to negative TFP shocks
are just the inverse of Figure 1.6, which implies skilled employment falls more than
unskilled employment during downturns. Intuitively, this is because the model econ-
omy has a higher vacancy posting cost for skilled than for unskilled positions. In
recessions, firms post fewer vacancies for skilled workers due to this higher cost, and
the outflow from unemployment drops accordingly.
1.6 Discussion
In this section, I discuss several alternative explanations for changes in the
cyclical dynamics of skilled and unskilled employment. These potential candidates
include deunionization, international trade, changing age composition of the labor
force, and tax cuts.
DiNardo et al (1996) and Lee (1999) provide evidence that the large decline
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in unionization in recent decades has made labor markets more competitive and
increased wage dispersion.29 Can deunionization explain rising instability of skilled
employment relative to unskilled? A priori, we would expect that labor unions
aim to stabilize wage rates and employment. Considering the strong bargaining
power of labor unions, one might expect employment of union members to be more
stable than that of non-union members. If so, deunionization would be expected
to increase employment volatility, especially for unskilled workers who are likely to
be unionized. Even if at the aggregate level labor unions make employment more
sensitive to various shocks by increasing wage stickiness, it is still hard to argue that
deunionization contributes a lot to the observed patterns of employment volatility,
because of timing. The US deunionization started in the 1950’s. We did not observe
a decline in relative unskilled employment volatility until the 1980s.
Globalization has transformed international economic activities substantially
in recent decades. Is it possible that globalization plays an important role in changes
in employment volatility? Existing empirical and theoretical literature generates di-
verging results. Intuitively, material offshoring may make labor demand more elastic
since firms can easily replace domestic workers and force unskilled workers to move
to low-wage industries. Empirical studies by Slaughter (2001) and Senses (2007) are
consistent with this intuition. This implies that workers in industries with foreign
competition may have more risk of being displaced by material offshoring. However,
other papers present conflicting results. Munch (2005), using a panel of Danish
29One side effect of unionization is to hinder employment growth, as discussed in Leonard (1992),
and Bronars, Deere and Tracy (1994).
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workers, finds that the impact of offshoring on the probability of displacement is
modest while Geishecker (2008) documents a large effect for Germany. Meanwhile,
Bergin, Feenstra and Hanson (2007) find that outsourcing makes employment more
volatile overseas, but reduces employment fluctuations in the US. In my opinion,
this channel may be helpful in explaining the volatility decline in the overall and
unskilled employment, but is unlikely to explain the increasing relative volatility of
skilled employment. Mankiw and Swagel (2006) show that service offshoring exerts
a positive influence on US total employment. However, the level rise in US total em-
ployment should not have any direct implication for relative volatility of skilled and
unskilled workers. If material or service outsouring is an important factor affecting
employment volatility, it should have more influence in industries with high levels of
imports and outports. However, Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008) check sector effects
and find that the increase in relative skilled employment volatility affects all sectors
of the economy.
Changes in the demographic composition of the workforce can lead to variation
in business cycle volatility. Clark and Summers (1981), Rios-Rull (1996), Gomme et
al (2005) and Jaimovich and Siu (2009) show that the cyclical volatilities of employ-
ment and hours are U-shaped as a function of age. Is it possible that demographic
changes in the labor force account for changes in the cyclical dynamics of employ-
ment? The answer appears to be negative. Jaimovich and Siu (2009) claim that the
associated demographic effects of the US baby boom and baby bust contribute to
the Great Moderation. That is, changes in the age composition have dampened the
volatility of labor in recent years rather than increasing it. Thus, the demographic
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change may be helpful in understanding the changing cyclical volatility of overall
employment, but can not explain the rising volatility of skilled labor.
As for the significant tax cuts in 1981 and 1986, Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008)
have already analyzed their potential effect on employment volatility. They assert
that tax cuts may induce already employed workers to work more, but have a small
effect on the decision of whether to work or not. Given that a large fraction of the
volatility of hours worked comes from that of employment, tax cuts do not seem to
an important factor. Tax cuts may have a larger impact on employment decisions for
women than for men. Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008) narrow down the observations
to white male workers and find the same volatility pattern.
1.7 Conclusion
I propose that rising matching efficiency helps explain the recent increase in
employment volatility of skilled workers. Although there are various potential fac-
tors affecting the cyclical behavior of the labor market, such as institutions, fiscal
policy and demographic composition, it is not clear that any of these factors can
explain the rising volatility of skilled labor. While other factors may also contribute
to changing labor market dynamics, I assert that technology advance in matching
plays an important role.
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Chapter 2
Capital-Skill Complementarity and Employment Volatility
Over the Business Cycle
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to explore the contribution of capital-skill com-
plementarity to short-run employment fluctuations. In general, the quantities and
prices of labor inputs are both key variables of interest in evaluating macroeconomic
models. Given that capital-skill complementarity is a leading explanation for long-
run changes in the skill premium, it is interesting to check its short-run implications
for employment volatility. Does complementarity cause skilled employment to be
more volatile than unskilled employment? Does allowing for complementarity im-
prove upon existing DSGE models’ implications for labor market volatility? Does
investment-specific technological change matter when complementarity is present?
The answer to the first question is yes; to the second, no; to the third, yes.
The concrete definition of complementarity used in this paper is borrowed from
Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull and Violante (2000, henceforth KORV (2000)). Their
contribution is to use observable variables to capture unobservable skill-biased tech-
nology changes and to choose parameter values that allow the model to match the
observed secular trend in the skill premium. In their framework, complementar-
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ity first means that the elasticity of substitution between unskilled labor and the
equipment-skill composite is larger than that between skilled labor and equipment.
Loosely speaking, equipment is complementary to skilled labor and is a substitute
for unskilled labor.
Another interesting implication of complementarity in KORV is that the rel-
ative marginal product of skilled to unskilled employment is an increasing function
of the equipment-skill ratio. Thus, changes in the equipment-skill ratio affect the
relative volatility of skilled and unskilled employment. The second implication is
also the main intuition of this paper. Without complmentarity, the standard DSGE
model implies that the relative labor demand curve is only determined by the rel-
ative wage. With complementarity, the relative labor demand also depends on the
equipment-skill ratio. If there is a positive shock and the equipment-skill ratio in-
creases, then the relative demand for skilled labor increases. As a result, skilled
employment has a higher percentage change than unskilled employment.1 There-
fore, complementarity can make skilled employment more volatile in DSGE models.
This mechanism presumes that the equipment-skill ratio varies over the business
cycle. In fact, Lindquist (2004) documents that this ratio is procyclical and lags
output over the cycle in the data.
To check the short-run effect of complementarity for employment, I set up a
benchmark model in which capital is divided into structures and equipment and pro-
duction features equipment-skill complementarity. For comparison purposes, I also
set up a traditional model and an extended model. The traditional model features
1Please check Figure 2.1.
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a CES production function without complementarity while the extended one has
an additional exogenous shock, namely a shock to investment-specific technology
change. Comparing the traditional and benchmark models, we realize the contri-
bution of complementarity. Moreover, Greenwood, Hercowitiz and Krusell (1997,
henceforth GHK (1997)) and (2000) argue for the importance of investment-specific
change at both long-run and short-run horizons. The extended model explores the
combined effect of complementarity and investment shocks.
The paper is related to several lines of economic literature. First, this paper is
connected with the literature on labor market volatility. Real business cycle theories
have been criticized for failing to duplicate some significant facts regarding the labor
market, such as the fluctuations of labor hours. Initially, RBC models relied on high
degrees of labor supply elasticity to generate realistic labor market volatility. Indi-
visible labor, introduced by Rogerson (1984) and Hansen (1985), helps reconcile the
low degree of the intertemporal elasticity implied by micro evidence with observed
fluctuations in the labor market, as indivisible labor transforms an individual utility
function with a low degree of intertemporal elasticity into a representative agent’s
utility with an infinite elasticity. In this paper, I examine if complementarity can
improve on the ability of RBC models to match observed labor market volatility.
Second, a growing literature has documented and discussed secular changes
in the labor market. In order to explain the behavior of the skill premium, KORV
(2000) use a partial equilibrium approach and asks whether a model with comple-
mentarity and the given capital stock series can reproduce the observed annual fluc-
tuations of the skill premium. By relying on the same partial equilibrium method,
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Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008) try to explain the increasing volatility of skilled em-
ployment since the mid-1980’s. As explained earlier, my paper adopts a dynamic
general equilibrium model, instead of partial equilibrium, to examine the impli-
cations of complementarity for labor quantity dynamics by skill. Lindquist (2004)
constructs a dynamic general equilibrium model mainly to explain why the skill pre-
mium is acyclical over the business cycle. When constructing the model, Lindquist
(2004) assumes that skilled workers and unskilled workers constitute one unit of
measure, abstracting from the issue of unemployment. I abstract from skill accu-
mulation for the sake of simplicity while I allow for voluntary unemployment within
the household in the model.
I construct models with fluctuations in employment instead of total hours
worked. In the data, the fluctuation of total hours worked comes from both em-
ployment and average hours per worker. However, the fluctuation of employment is
responsible for more than 80% of that of total hours. Thus, it is natural to model
the cyclical dynamics of employment and allow for the presence of unemployment.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents empirical evidence for
variables of interest and presents the cyclical properties of the US economy. Section
3 constructs the benchmark model with complementarity that contains two types
of capital, equipment and structures. Section 4 calibrates the model. Section 5 sets
up two control models, which help identify the exact impact of complementarity.
Section 6 summarizes the paper.
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2.2 Empirical Observations
In this section, I present the business cycle dynamics of employment, output,
consumption, and investment in the US data. I log these variables and apply the
widely-used Hodrick-Prescott filter to extract the cyclical components. Volatilities
are calculated based on these cyclical components. Labor market variables are com-
puted using the CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (MORG) dataset from
1984q1 through 2006q4. Output, consumption and investment are seasonally ad-
justed quarterly data from NIPA accounts over the same period. I document these
statistics as a standard to judge how well the model with capital-skill complemen-
tarity performs. The volatility ratios of employment to GDP and skilled to unskilled
employment are the main indicators I use to assess the models’ performance.
2.2.1 MORG dataset
The MORG dataset is compiled by the NBER from extracts of the CPS An-
nual Earnings file and contains monthly data on weekly hours and earnings. The
original CPS outgoing rotation group data are recorded each month. The Bureau
of Labor Statistics extracts about 25,000 records of those outgoing households per
month and assigns each household an earnings weight such that aggregate statistics
are representative of the U.S. population. I follow the BLS’s suggestion and use
the earnings weights to aggregate individual observations. I aggregate the original
monthly data into a quarterly series of 92 observations for the variables of interest.
I apply standard sample selection criteria to handle missing observations and
42
coding errors.2 After applying these criteria, I get about 45,000 individuals per
quarter, of which on average about 10,600 hold at least a college degree. I restrict
attention to individuals in the labor force between 16 and 65 years of age that are
not self-employed.
The variables constructed from the MORG data include employment, total
hours in efficiency units, total usual hours, average hours per worker and average
wage rates. These statistics are calculated for the entire labor force, and for the
skilled and unskilled workers respectively. The MORG variables used to construct
these statistics include employment status, class status,3 usual weekly earnings (in-
cluding overtime, tips and commissions), usual weekly hours worked, and a set of
demographic variables including age, sex, race and education. Weekly earnings are
top-coded in the CPS. I follow Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008) to adjust these top-
coded earnings. They suggest that top-coded earnings be multiplied by 1.3 to ensure
that average earnings in the top decile remain constant from December 1988 to Jan-
uary 1989. In addition, I follow Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008) and compute real
weekly earnings by dividing nominal weekly earnings by the Consumer Price Index
(CPI).
In order to compute skilled and unskilled aggregates, I follow the efficiency-
units method suggested by Katz and Murphy (1992), KORV (2000) and Castro
and Coen-Pirani (2008). A skilled worker is defined as one with at least a four-
year college degree and an unskilled worker is an individual with less than 16 years
2These criteria are conventional. Please check Wu (2010) for details.
3Class status refers to whether the worker’s job is private, government, or self-employed.
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of education. To compute aggregate hours in a way that controls for composition
effects, I use the real average wages as weights when aggregating the hours worked
by individuals in 240 demographic groups.
Now I briefly summarize some variables of interest as follows:
Employment: Aggregate employment in any given quarter is the total number
of individuals, weighted with their CPS earnings weight, who report being at work
that quarter. For the sake of comparison, I calculate this statistic for total employ-
ment, skilled employment and unskilled employment. For the whole sample period,
the average total employment rate is 94%, the average skilled employment rate4 is
23% and the average unskilled employment rate5 is 71%.
Hours Worked in Efficiency Units: I use the efficiency-units approach to com-
pute the total hours worked. These statistics are used to calculate the volatility
ratio of employment to hours. To aggregate workers in different groups, I construct
time-invariant weights for each demographic group. I use the average wages for each
group as weights to aggregate total hours worked across different subgroups as in
Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008).
Total Usual Hours Worked: This is defined as the simple aggregation of hours
worked across 240 subgroups without weights. This statistic is computed for refer-
ence.
4The skilled employment rate is defined as the ratio of skilled employment to the entire labor
force.
5The unskilled employment rate is defined as the ratio of unskilled employment to the entire
labor force.
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Average Hours Worked: This is defined as total hours in efficiency units di-
vided by employment.
Average Wage Rates: This is defined as total earnings divided by employment.
These variables constructed from the MORG dataset display strong seasonal
components. Thus, before any further data analysis, I have to deseasonlize these
series. I use three methods to adjust the raw series: regressing raw series on quarter
dummies, the Census Bureau’s X12-ARIMA and the combination of X12-ARIMA
and centered five quarters MA6 suggested by Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008). Then
I apply the Hodrick-Prescott filter with parameter 1600 to these seasonally adjusted
series.
Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 shows the standard deviations of these variables from
these three different methods. Table 2.1 is used to compare with my model economies.
2.2.2 NIPA data
I take other time series from NIPA accounts. These variables include output,
consumption and investment. I apply the Hodrick-Prescott filter to real quarterly
logs of GDP, consumption and investment and calculate standard deviations for their
variabilities. These moments are used to evaluate the model’s performance. Follow-
ing GHK (1997), I also construct logs of real GDP, consumption and investment in
6Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008) suggest applying a centered 5 quarters moving average filter
to the seasonally adjusted series to remove high frequency variations. Comparing these computed
aggregates, the results using quarter dummies and X12-ARIMA are similar while the results from
the combined method of X12 and MA5 reduce the labor market fluctuations significantly.
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consumption units. That is, I divide the nominal macro series by the price deflator
of nondurable consumption goods and services. Then I apply the Hodrick-Prescott
filter to get the associated cyclical statistics. I use this procedure to guarantee that
the statistics in the data are consistent with their counterparts in the model with
investment shocks.
Table 2.4 summarizes the key moments computed from the MORG and NIPA
data.
2.3 The Benchmark Model
This section outlines a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. The
model economy contains two types of economic agents: one representative house-
hold, consisting of a continuum of infinitely-lived individuals, and one representa-
tive firm, which uses labor and capital to maximize the expected discounted value
of profit. The production function uses four types of factor inputs: capital struc-
tures, capital equipment, skilled and unskilled labor. The production function fea-
tures capital-skill complementarity. Finally, the model economy includes one exoge-
nous shock affecting total factor productivity. Time is discrete and is denoted by
t = 0, 1, 2, · · · .
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2.3.1 The Household
There is a representative household that includes a continuum of members
with measure 1. Individuals are divided into two types: skilled or unskilled.7 In this
paper, I focus on the extensive margin of the labor market. One reason for this is that
more than three quarters of total hours fluctuations stem from the extensive margin.
In addition, policymakers and the public pay more attention to the employment rate
than to total hours worked. By concentrating on employment, the model can be
regarded as an attempt to enrich general equilibrium models with unemployment.
RBC models characterize agents as continuously adjusting their hours, while the
indivisible labor hypothesis of Hansen (1985) highlights the extensive margin of
the labor market. A variant of standard RBC models is proposed by Cho and
Cooley (1994) who allow representative agents to choose both margins. In my model,
the household maximizes the aggregate utility by optimally supplying labor and
allocating consumption goods among household members. The utility level depends
on consumption and dis-utility from employment. The aggregate utility function
is the weighted sum of the utilities of skilled and unskilled labor. The household
optimally equalizes the marginal utility of consumption within household members
of the same type, and also equalizes the weighted marginal utility of consumption
7In the model economy, skilled and unskilled workers have different consumption because of the
differences in their utility weights in the preference function. However, the same type of workers
enjoy the same amount of consumption regardless of employment status. This kind of assumption
seems realistic given that in the real economy consumption is different for workers of various
education levels.
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where the subscript “s” is related to skilled labor, while “u” represents unskilled
workers. β is the subjective discount factor; λi, i ∈ {s, u} is the subjective weight
that the household places on the utility of the two types; χi, i ∈ {s, u} governs the
disutility of labor supply; li is the measure of each type of worker in the labor force,
where ls+ lu = 1; cit is consumption for type-i workers at period t; nit is the measure
of employment for each type of worker; and uit is the corresponding unemployment
measure at period t, where li = nit + uit. I assume that the household is able to
insure its members against all idiosyncratic shocks, mimicking the complete markets
allocation. Because utility is separable in consumption and leisure, all members of
a given type of labor enjoy the same consumption regardless of their employment
status.
In the model, the household makes decisions regarding not only the supply of
two kinds of labor, but also the accumulation of two kinds of capital. Why distin-
guish capital equipment from capital structures? The intuition is that capital equip-
ment is more connected to technological change and thus more complementary with
skilled employment than capital structures. In addition, these two types of capital
have quite different accumulation patterns in the data. GHK (1997) demonstrate
the important role of investment-specific technological change. Supporting evidence
includes the continuously falling price of equipment and faster means of communi-
cation and transportation. Based on these observations, GHK (1997) divide capital
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into two categories. Capital equipment is subject to increasing efficiency in its pro-
duction, while capital structures keep a roughly constant production efficiency over
time. In an extension below, I add investment shocks into the benchmark model.
At the beginning of each period, an exogenous neutral technology shock is
realized. Based on the technological state and capital stock, the household decides
how many skilled and unskilled workers to supply. Given that the measure of the
labor force in the model economy is unity,8 the employment rate is equal to the
sum of the measures of skilled and unskilled employees. Moreover, the household
owns capital structures and equipment and rents them out to the firm. At the
end of the period, household members receive wage payments and capital returns
from the firm. As the firm owners, household members get corporate profits. At this
stage, the household decides how much to consume for instantaneous utility and how
much to invest for next period’s capital stock. That is, they allocate their resources
between consumption, structures and equipment investment. The aggregate budget
constraint from the household’s perspective can be expressed as:
0 = πt + wstnst + wutnut + rstkst + retket − lscst − lucut − ist − iet (2.2)
where πt is the profit received by the household at period t; wit is the state-contingent
wage rate for type-i workers in period t; rst and ret are the return rates for capital
structures and equipment at period t, respectively; kst and ket are the stocks for
8I abstract from fluctuations in the labor participation rate. According to the MORG dataset,
the mean participation rate over the sample period is around 60%. This rate is determined not
only by economic factors, but also by other non-economic concerns, such as health. Therefore,
macroeconomic models usually step away from modeling labor force participation.
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capital structures and equipment at period t; and ist and iet are investment in
capital structures and equipment at period t, respectively.
For capital structures and equipment, the laws of motion take the conventional
form:9
0 = ks,t+1 − (1− δs)kst − ist (2.3)
0 = ke,t+1 − (1− δe)ket − iet (2.4)
where δs and δe are depreciation rates for capital structures and equipment.
2.3.2 The Firm
The firm in the model uses a production technology with capital-skill comple-
mentarity. The firm rents capital structures and equipment and hires two types of
workers from the household. At the end of the period, the firm pays wages and cap-
ital rents. The input prices are determined in perfectly competitive factor markets.














zt = ρzzt−1 + εzt, εzt ∼ N(0, σ2z) (2.6)
where zt is the shock to general TFP; and ai is the type-specific weight in pro-
duction. KORV (2000) uses the above function to capture the idea that capital
equipment is more complementary to skilled employees than unskilled employees.
9There is no capital adjustment cost in the model. One reason is that calibrating the adjustment
cost parameters is problematic in this type of model, as discussed in GHH (2000).
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Technically, this requires that the substitution elasticity between unskilled employ-
ment and the skill-equipment composite, 1
1−θ1 , is larger than that between skilled
employment and equipment, 1
1−θ2 . In turn, this requires θ1 > θ2. Implicitly, this
production specification assumes that the substitution elasticity between unskilled
workers and capital is identical to that between unskilled and skilled workers, which
is supported by the evidence in Johnson (1997). Capital equipment and structures
have asymmetric positions in production because they have different substitution
possibilities with labor and are not perfect substitutes for each other.
Capital-skill complementarity is also reflected in the marginal product ratio of
skilled to unskilled labor. Specifically, when θ1 > θ2, the relative marginal product
of skilled workers is an increasing function of capital equipment. The more capital
is accumulated, the more productive skilled workers are relative to unskilled on the










)θ2 + 1] θ1−θ2θ2 (2.7)
where as
au
is referred to as the relative efficiency effect, nut
nst
is the relative quantity
effect, and ket
asnst
is the capital-skill complementarity effect.
The factor input markets are perfectly competitive. The rents of factor inputs
are determined solely by their marginal contribution to production. Firms, as price





yt − wstnst − wutnut − rstkst − retket
}
(2.8)
10Note that perfect competition in factor markets and constant returns to scale jointly guarantee
that the profit is zero in equilibrium.
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The competitive equilibrium is now formulated. This equilibrium is the com-
bined outcome of the household’s utility-maximizing and the firm’s profit-optimizing
problems. The dynamic programming problem facing the representative household
is:


















+ βEtV (t+ 1|t)
}
(P.1)
s.t. 0 = πt + wstnst + wutnut + rstkst + retket − lscst − lucut − ist − iet (2.10)
0 = ks,t+1 − (1− δs)kst − ist (2.11)
0 = ke,t+1 − (1− δe)ket − iet (2.12)





yt − wstnst − wutnut − rstkst − retket
}
(P.2)













The aggregate state of the model economy is SSt = {kst, ket, zt} for period
t. Assume that the equilibrium wages and rents are functions of the state of the
economy: wst = Ws(SSt), wut = Wu(SSt), rst = Rs(SSt), ret = Re(SSt). Suppose
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that capital structures and equipment evolve according to ks,t+1 = Ks(SSt), ke,t+1 =
Ku(SSt).
A competitive equilibrium is defined based on the above assumptions. Specif-
ically, equilibrium is a set of allocation rules, prices and transfer functions and an
aggregate law of motion for the state variables that satisfy:
1. The household maximizes (P.1), taking as given the aggregate state SSt and
the pricing and transfer functions, Ws, Wu, Rs and Ru. The household’s
solution is:
cst = Cs(SSt), cut = Cu(SSt), nst = Ns(SSt), nut = Nu(SSt), kst+1 = Ks(SSt),
ket+1 = Ku(SSt);
2. The firm solves (P.2), given SSt, Ws, Wu, Rs and Ru. Its solution can be char-
acterized as: ñst = Ñs(SSt), ñut = Ñu(SSt), k̃st = K̃s(SSt), k̃et = K̃e(SSt);












+ kst(1− δs) + ket(1− δe)
= ks,t+1 + ke,t+1 + lscst + lucut;
4. All markets clear: ñst = nst, ñut = nut, k̃st = kst, k̃et = ket.
2.4 Calibration
Before solving the competitive equilibrium numerically, it is necessary to assign
values to structural parameters. In this section, I follow conventional procedures.
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First, some structural parameters are assigned values according to widely accepted
RBC literature. Then given these borrowed parameters, all other parameters are
set in such a way that the model matches certain stylized facts in the U.S. data.
These unknown parameters govern the utility function, production function and the
exogenous processes.
2.4.1 Parameters in the Utility Function: β, σs, σu, ηs, ηu, λs, λu, χs, χu,
ls, lu
The subjective discount factor, β, is the inverse of the time-discount rate,
which in equilibrium equals the steady state return on capital. In standard RBC
models, it is conventional to assume that the steady state annual rate of return on
capital is about 5 percent. Thus, the corresponding quarterly subjective discount
factor, β, is equal to 0.987.
The coefficient of relative risk-aversion, σi, i ∈ {s, u}, governs the curvature
of utility with respect to consumption. Estimates of σ display a certain degree of
divergence in the empirical literature. For example, to make their model replicate
the impulse responses implied by a VAR estimated using U.S. data, Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997) set σ to 0.16. Hall (1988) and Attanasio and Weber (1993)
estimate σ to be around 3, using aggregate consumption data. Fuhrer (2000) finds σ
to be about 6, assuming habit formation in consumption. All these estimates regard
individuals as identical while my model has divided labor into two subgroups. To
follow the RBC convention, I set σs = σu = 1 so that the consumption part of the
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utility function takes the log form.
ηs and ηu are the marginal disutilities for skilled and unskilled labor. If I
assume that each type of worker works a fixed number of hours per period, then ηs
and ηu also govern the Frisch elasticities for the household of skilled and unskilled






use total hours worked as the measure of labor input, and assume that the steady
state value of labor supply is one third of non-sleeping time. This implies that
the Frisch elasticity is 2.11 However, empirical estimates of the Frisch elasticity
are quite different. Studies such as MaCurdy (1981), Altonji (1986) and Browning,
Deaton and Irish (1985) find elasticities between 0 and 0.5. More recently, Browning,
Hansen and Heckman (1999) report estimates ranging from 0.5 to 1.6. Imai and
Keane (2004) provide a relatively high estimate of 3.8. In the benchmark version
of my model, I set the elasticity to 0.5, implying ηs = ηu = 2, to make sure that
the marginal disutilities of skilled and unskilled employment fall within a reasonable
range. Again, I abstract from differences in this elasticity between the two types of
workers.
λs and λu are subjective weights of skilled and unskilled workers in the house-
hold utility. I set λs and λu to make sure that the steady state consumption ratio
between skilled and unskilled labor is consistent with its empirical counterpart.12
11The Frisch elasticity is defined as dlog(h)dlog(w)
∣∣∣
c
, where h is labor hours, w is wage rate, and c is





1−η , the Frisch elasticity is
1−h
h . If we
assume that h = 0.33, then the elasticity is 2.
12In the model economy, the social planner guarantees only that workers of the same type have
the same amount of consumption.
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The Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) dataset collects “total average annual ex-
penditure” by education level since 1996. I find the mean value of the consumption
ratio to be 1.67.
χs and χu are free parameters which are used to guarantee that the steady state
levels of skilled and unskilled employment are consistent with the long-run means
implied by MORG data. Finally, ls and lu are the shares of skilled and unskilled
workers in the labor force, which are estimated directly from MORG statistics.
2.4.2 Parameters for the Production Sector: αks, θ1, θ2, as, au, δs, δe
αks is capital structures’ share of output. GHK (2000) set αks to 0.13 while
assuming that the overall capital share of output is 0.35. I follow their practice and
choose the same value.
θ1 is directly related to the substitution elasticity between unskilled employ-
ment and the capital-skill composite. The empirical literature offers a wide range of
estimates. Based on different specifications of functional form, estimation technique
and data, estimates of the substitution elasticity range from 0.5 to 3, which implies
θ1 between -1 and 0.667. A good summary is provided by Hamermesh (1993). I
take the value from KORV (2000), θ1 = 0.401.
θ2 is associated with the substitution elasticity between skilled employment
and capital. Empirical work finds that this parameter is generally less than 1.2. To
keep my production function as standard as possible, I borrow its value from KORV
(2000). That is, θ2 = −0.491.
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as and au are type-specific production weights. The two types of workers are
neither perfect substitutes nor equally productive in production. Hence, as and au
are set to match the observed ratios of employment in efficiency units to employment
for both types of workers. For the whole sample period, the production weight for
skilled workers is 12.58 while that for unskilled workers 7.28. Here, I normalize au
to be 1 and set as to 12.58/7.28.
δs and δe are the depreciation rates for capital structures and equipment.
GHK (2000) set the annual depreciation rates of capital structures and equipment
to 0.056 and 0.124. The corresponding quarterly depreciation rates are 0.014 and
0.031, respectively. Therefore, I set δs = 0.014 and δe = 0.031.
2.4.3 Parameters for the Exogenous Process: ρz, σz
I follow the standard RBC literature to assume that the neutral technology
shock is an AR(1) process. Specifically, zt = ρzzt−1 + εzt, εzt ∼ N(0, σ2z). The
associated parameter values are borrowed from Cooley and Hansen (1995).
2.4.4 Parameters for Control Models: αk, θ3, δ, ρq, σq
Given that the purpose of this paper is to explore the short-run implications of
capital-skill complementarity, it is necessary to set up and examine control models
for comparison purposes. This paper has two control models, namely the traditional
and extended models.13 In the traditional model, I allow two types of labor inputs,
namely skilled and unskilled workers, as in my benchmark model. However, there
13Table 2.5 lists the features of these three models.
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is no complementarity and only one type of capital in production. According to
Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998), the elasticity of substitution between skilled and
unskilled workers falls into the interval between 1 and 2. Katz and Murphy (1992)
estimate the elasticity as 1.4. In the traditional model, I use a CES function to
combine skilled and unskilled labor inputs and set the elasticity of substitution to









The output share of capital, αk, is set to 0.35, and the monthly depreciation rate, δ
is set to 0.025, according to classic RBC literature.
The extended version of the model includes shocks to investment-specific tech-
nology. One reason to do this is that GHK (1997) document that investment shocks
have significant impacts both on long-run growth and on the business cycle. Fisher
(2006) and Justinian et al (2009) confirm the importance of investment shocks in
high-frequency cycles. The other reason is that the investment shock is highly asso-
ciated with capital equipment, which also plays a key role distinct from structures
in my model with capital-skill complementarity. The extended model is identical to
the benchmark model except for the law of motion of capital equipment:
0 = ket+1 − (1− δe)ket − eqtit (2.15)
where qt = ρqqt−1 + εqt, εqt ∼ N(0, σ2q ) (2.16)
qt is also assumed to be independent of the neutral technology shocks. I borrow
the associated parameter values from GHH (2000) and convert them into monthly
frequency.
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Table 2.6 summarizes parameter values for the benchmark and extended mod-
els while Table 2.7 presents calibration results for the traditional model.
2.5 Numerical Results
The cyclical behavior of the benchmark model is evaluated and discussed in
this section. For comparison purposes, I also set up a traditional version of the
DSGE model and an extended model with investment shocks. The main conclu-
sions are listed below. First, capital-skill complementarity helps the model explain
the observed volatility ratio of skilled to unskilled employment; Second, this com-
plementarity does not improve upon the DSGE model’s performance on overall
employment volatility; Third, the investment shock is dominated by the neutral
shock in such a way that their joint effect on the model economy is not significantly
different from the case of having only the neutral shock.
I solve my DSGE models numerically. Given that the purpose of this paper
is not to compare the welfare properties of different model economies, I apply the
first-order perturbation method. To obtain the summary statistics of interest from
the model, I simulate the model repeatedly to get 300 samples of artificial time
series. For each sample, I keep the same number of periods as the corresponding
time length in the data. After the raw series are generated, I transform them back
to levels, extract the cyclical components, and calculate the corresponding standard
deviations.
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2.5.1 Volatility Ratio of Skilled and Unskilled Employment
As Tables 2.8 and 2.9 show, the benchmark model generates skilled employ-
ment that is more volatile than unskilled employment, while the traditional model
implies that both have the same volatility.14 Capital-skill complementarity con-
tributes much to this result. Intuitively speaking, complementarity puts the two
types of labor in asymmetric positions in the production function. Remember that
the relative marginal product of skilled employment is identical to the relative de-
mand of skilled labor, and complementarity adds the capital-skill ratio, ket
asnst
, into
the demand function. The impact of capital equipment on the relative demand, via
the capital-skill-ratio mechanism, makes it possible for skilled employment to fluc-
tuate more than unskilled employment. When there is a positive technology shock,
equipment investment drives up the stock of capital equipment, which shifts up-
ward the relative demand curve for skilled labor as Figure 2.1 shows. Keeping other
factors constant, it is clear that skilled employment has a larger percentage change
than unskilled labor under complementarity. Lindquist (2004) documents that the
capital-skill ratio has a standard deviation 1.3 times that of output, is weakly pro-
cyclical and lags output over the cycle.15 On the contrary, the traditional model
can not produce this result due to its assumptions on the production function. The
relative marginal product in the traditional model is a function only of the two
14The first row of Table 2.9 shows that complementarity causes the volatility ratio between
skilled and unskilled employment to be larger than 1 while the traditional model makes the ratio
to be 1.
15Please check Tables 1 and 2 in Lindquist (2004).
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types of labor inputs. In turn, this implies that the employment ratio of skilled and
unskilled is constant. It follows that both types have the same fluctuation in the
traditional model.
In the benchmark model, the relative volatility is not sensitive to the degree of
complementarity. This is contrary to what Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008) advocate.
They argue that changes in the degree of complementarity in the US in recent years
explain a large part of the recent volatility change in skilled hours. They estimate
θ2 to increase from -2.2 to -0.4 at the 1979-2003 period. I simulate the benchmark
model for both values and record the results in Table 2.10. Castro and Coen-Pirani
(2008) use a partial equilibrium framework to study relative labor demand by skill.
By making the relative marginal product consistent with the long-run behavior of
the skill premium, they pin down the long run change in the substitution elasticity.
They then use the implied relative demand curve to back out a series of skilled hours,
and explore this series’ cyclical properties. However, in the DSGE framework, the
volatility ratio is closely related to the cyclical movement of ket
asnst
. When the capital-
skill ratio increases in response to a positive shock, the relative demand for skilled
labor increases, and the volatility of skilled employment becomes larger than that
of unskilled employment. This is also why the benchmark model has a hard time
generating a volatility ratio less than one. To produce a volatility ratio below one in
the model with complementarity, the capital-skill ratio must be countercyclical. One
way to accomplish this is to set ηs = ηu = 0, which makes the labor supply elasticity
of both types infinite, dramatically increasing employment variability. In this case,
then the economy has a positive shock, skilled employment immediately jumps up
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a lot, which dominates the movement of the capital-skill ratio and pulls down the
relative demand curve. As a result, the benchmark model has skilled employment
less volatile than unskilled employment. However, please note that the correlation
between the capital-skill ratio and output becomes -0.391, which is contradictory to
empirical evidence.
The impulse responses are illustrative in understanding the mechanics of the
model economy. Figure 2.2 presents the responses of output, consumption, employ-
ment and investment to a neutral technology shock of one standard deviation. With
a favorable neutral shock, all variables jump up. Following a positive response of
equipment investment, the resulting increase of the equipment stock drives up the
relative demand for skilled employment. One interesting fact is that the percentage
increase of equipment investment is higher than that of structures investment. The
main reason is their asymmetric positions in the production function. If ks and ke
have symmetric positions in the production function, such as y = ezkα̃s k
α̃
e F (ns, nu),
and have the same depreciation rates, these two types of capitals have the same
investment pattern. Another determinant is the depreciation rate. Keeping other
factors constant, investment in a given type of capital is lower when it has a high
depreciation rate than when it has a low depreciation rate.
2.5.2 Volatility Ratio of Employment to Output
Capital-skill complementarity does not improve the ability of the DSGE model
to explain the observed volatility ratio of employment to output compared with the
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traditional RBC model, as displayed by the second row of Table 2.9. One clever
way to overcome this weakness is proposed by Rogerson (1984) and Hansen (1985).
Although complementarity has a direct impact on the volatility ratio of skilled to
unskilled labor, its influence on the volatility ratio of employment to output is
ambiguous. Consider Figure 2.1. When a positive shock hits the economy, the
increased equipment stock shifts up the relative demand curve, resulting in a higher
ratio of skilled to unskilled employment. Given that skilled workers are more efficient
and require higher wages, firms who hire more skilled workers choose to employ fewer
unskilled workers. Thus, unskilled workers have a smaller percentage increase, which
decreases the volatility of unskilled labor and consequently pulls down the volatility
for total employment relative to output.
2.5.3 Investment-Specific Shocks
Investment-specific shocks have been identified by GHH (1997) and others as
an important source of economic fluctuations. I examine the impact of investment
shocks in the extended model and find that they can increase the volatility of skilled
employment by 36% when co-existing with neutral technology shocks. Tables 2.11
and 2.12 record these results. Intuitively, when a positive investment shock ap-
pears, a given amount of output can be transformed to a larger amount of capital
equipment. Firms have incentives to extend production and invest more in capital
equipment. Thus, firms want to hire more workers. Since complementarity implies
that equipment is favorably biased towards skill, it follows that skilled employment
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experiences a larger percentage change. Table 2.12 shows that when the economy has
only investment shocks, the volatility ratio of skilled to unskilled employment is 7.5.
Meanwhile, this model generates only about 15% of the observed output volatility.
Adding investment shocks to neutral technology shocks causes the volatility ratio
between skilled and unskilled labor to jump by 36%. However, overall output and
employment volatility in the extended model is only slightly higher than in the
benchmark model.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper examines the short-run implications of capital-skill complementar-
ity for the labor market’s volatility. Within the DSGE framework, complementarity
can make skilled employment more volatile than unskilled employment. However,
complementarity does not increase the volatility of total employment. In addition,




Table 1.1: Volatilities of Employment, Hours and GDP 








1979-2003 0.0132 0.0081 0.0068 0.0092 0.0091 0.0085 0.0108 
1979-1983 0.0218 0.0126 0.0051  
(0.234)    
0.0153 
(0.702) 
0.0143 0.0072  0.0183 
1984-2003 0.0097 0.0065 0.0072 
(0.742)     
0.0067 
(0.691) 
0.0071 0.0088  0.0077 
Notes:  
1. Data on employment and hours are from MORG of CPS, and GDP is from NIPA.  
2. All data are first converted to quarterly series，then are logged and detrended using the H-P filter 
with a smoothing parameter of 1600. 
3. I use the Census Bureau’s X12 program to remove seasonality from each series. Given that the 
CPS data contains high-frequency measurement errors, I also apply a centered 5-quarter moving 
average to the seasonally adjusted series from MORG.  
4. Variables related to hours refer to aggregate hours in efficiency units. 




Table 1.2: Volatility Comparison between Employment and Hours 
 Period of Time Employment Hours Ratio 
1979-2003 0.0081 0.0091 0.89  
1979-1983 0.0126 0.0143 0.88  
All Workers 
1984-2003 0.0065 0.0071 0.92  
1979-2003 0.0068 0.0085 0.80  
1979-1983 0.0051      0.0072  0.71  
Skilled Workers 
1984-2003 0.0072      0.0088   0.82  
1979-2003 0.0092 0.0108 0.85  
1979-1983 0.0153 0.0183 0.84  
Unskilled Workers 
1984-2003 0.0067 0.0077 0.87  
Notes:  
1. Data on employment and hours are from MORG of CPS, and GDP is from NIPA.  
2. All data are first converted to quarterly series, then are logged and detrended using the H-P filter 
with a smoothing parameter of 1600. 
3. I use the Census Bureau’s X12 program to remove seasonality from each series. Given that the 
CPS data contain high-frequency measurement errors, I also apply a centered 5-quarter moving 
average to the seasonally adjusted series from MORG.  
4. Variables related to hours refer to the total hours in efficiency units. 
5. The column labeled “Ratio” refers to the volatility ratio of “Employment” to “Hours”. 
 
 
Table 1.3: Calibration Results for Simulation I 





Coefficient governing employment disutility: skilled
sη 2 






Labor force share: skilled
sl 0.2295 
Labor force share: unskilled
ul 0.7702 
Capital share of output α 0.35 
Coefficient governing elasticity of substitution σ 0.29 





















Autocorrelation of productivity shocks
zρ 0.98 
Standard deviation of productivity shocks
zσ 0.005 
Notes: sα varies between 0.25 and 0.65; sf and uf are set to guarantee that the 




Table 1.4: Summary Statistics of Labor Market for 1979-1983, 1984-2003 and 1979-2003 
 1979-1983 1984-2003 1979-2003
Skilled share of labor force 0.1840 0.2389 0.2295 
Ratio of skilled employment to labor force 0.1780 0.2325 0.2231 
Ratio of skilled unemployment to labor force 0.0060 0.0064 0.0063 
Unskilled share of labor force 0.8157 0.7608 0.7702 
Ratio of unskilled employment to labor force 0.7434 0.7040 0.7158 
Ratio of unskilled unemployment to labor force 0.0723 0.0507 0.0544 
Wage ratio of skilled to unskilled labor 1.66 1.87 1.82 
 
 
Table 1.5: Calibration Results for Simulation II 




Subjective discount factor β 0.996 0.996 
CRRA: skilled
sσ 1 1 
CRRA: unskilled
uσ 1 1 
Coefficient governing employment disutility: skilled
sη 2 2 
Coefficient governing employment disutility: unskilled
uη 2 2 
Utility weight: skilled
sλ 0.808 0.873 
Utility weight: unskilled
uλ 0.191 0.127 
Labor force share: skilled
sl 0.1840 0.2389 
Labor force share: unskilled
ul 0.8157 0.7608 
Capital share of output α 0.35 0.35 
Coefficient governing elasticity of substitution σ 0.29 0.29 
Depreciation rate of capital δ 0.0055 0.0055 
Production weight: skilled
sa 12.58/7.28 12.58/7.28 
Production weight: unskilled
ua 1 1 
Vacancy-posting cost: skilled
sf 6.25 17.17 
Vacancy-posting cost: unskilled
uf 2.23 4.08 
Separation rate: skilled
sχ 0.0198 0.0198 
Separation rate: unskilled
uχ 0.0369 0.0369 
Bargaining power: skilled
sφ 0.5 0.5 
Bargaining power: unskilled
uφ 0.5 0.5 
Matching efficiency: skilled
sα 0.72 0.94 
Matching efficiency: unskilled
uα 0.48 0.61 
Autocorrelation of productivity shocks
zρ 0.98 0.98 
Standard deviation of productivity shocks
zσ 0.005 0.005 




Table 1.6: Volatility Results of Simulation II 
 First Period  
(1979-1983) 
Second Period  
(1984-2003) 
Output 0.030928  0.030954  
Consumption 0.021462  0.021581  








Vacancies for the skilled 0.007598  0.005885  
Vacancies for the unskilled 0.007795  0.007065  
Skilled Unemployment 0.001797  0.003068  
Unskilled Unemployment 0.001921  0.002357  
Job-finding rate for the skilled 0.001865  0.003086  
Job-finding rate for the unskilled 0.002150  0.002566  
Overall Job-finding rate 0.002120  0.002626  
Note: Values in parentheses are the volatility ratios of variables of 





Table 1.7: Volatility Comparison between the Data and Simulation II 






































Notes: Relative volatilities refer to the volatility ratios between variables of 
interest to output or GDP; the last column labeled “Percentage Change” is the 
change of the relative volatilities between these two periods.  
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Figure 1.3: Ratio of rolling standard deviations (40 quarters ahead) of Unskilled and Skilled 
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Figure 1.6: Impulse Responses from Simulation II 







































































































































Table 2.1: Volatility of Employment, Hours and Wages: Seasonal Dummies 
 








All Workers 0.0077  0.0085  0.0099  0.0038  0.0087  
Skilled labor 0.0108  0.0122  0.0119  0.0047  0.0128  
Unskilled labor 0.0092  0.0105  0.0111  0.0034  0.0075  
Note: The values in this table are computed using HP-filtered data that has been seasonally adjusted by 




Table 2.2: Volatility of Employment, Hours and Wages: X12-ARIMA 
 








All Workers 0.0075  0.0085  0.0095  0.0035  0.0084  
Skilled labor 0.0102  0.0114  0.0112  0.0043  0.0121  
Unskilled labor 0.0085  0.0097  0.0103  0.0032  0.0072  
Note: The values in this table are computed using HP-filtered data that has been seasonally adjusted by 





Table 2.3: Volatility of Employment, Hours and Wages: Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008) 
 








All Workers 0.0066  0.0071  0.0083  0.0016  0.0066  
Skilled labor 0.0067  0.0082  0.0078  0.0021  0.0092  
Unskilled labor 0.0070  0.0081  0.0089  0.0021  0.0053  
Note: The values in this table are computed using HP-filtered data that has been seasonally adjusted by 
















Table 2.4: Volatility and Cross-Correlation: Data  
 Volatility Cross-correlation Volatility (2) Cross-correlation (2) 
GDP 0.0093  1 0.0097  1  
Consumption 0.0074  0.8222  0.0080  0.8458  
Investment 0.0426  0.8358  0.0419  0.7325  
Structures 
Investment 
0.0522  0.5686  0.0574  0.4274  
Equipment 
Investment 
0.0432  0.8708  0.0412  0.8090  
Aggregate 
Employment 
0.0077  0.7022  0.0077  0.6306  
Skilled 
Employment 
0.0108  0.4538  0.0108  0.4091  
Unskilled 
Employment 
0.0092  0.5948  0.0092  0.5256  
Skilled Wage 0.0128  0.2831  0.0128  0.3313  
Unskilled 
Wage 
0.0075  0.2187  0.0075  0.3565  
Notes: 1. The second and third columns show the volatilities and cross-correlation of real variables 
divided by the GDP deflator; 
      2. The fourth and fifth columns present the volatilities and cross-correlation of real variables 
divided by the price deflator of nondurable consumption and services; 
      3. Variables related to employment are de-seasonalized through regression on quarterly 
dummies; 
      4. Investment is defined as Private Gross Domestic Investment minus Residential investment, 
Equipment investment is investment on equipment and software while Structure investment 
is investment on nonresidential structures; 




Table 2.5: Comparison of Model Set-up 
 Capital-Skill 
Complementarity
Two Types of 
Labor 






Benchmark Version      
Traditional Version      
Extended Version      
 
 
Table 2.6 : Calibration Results for the Benchmark and Extended Models  









Coefficient governing employment disutility: skilled
sη 2 
Coefficient governing employment disutility: unskilled
uη 2 
Disutility weight of employment: skilled
sχ 10.2 






Capital structure share of output
ksα 0.13 
Coefficient governing substitution elasticity of unskilled
employment and capital equipment 1θ
0.401 
Coefficient governing substitution elasticity of skilled






Depreciation rate of capital structures
sδ 0.014 
Depreciation rate of capital equipment
eδ 0.031 
Autocorrelation of neutral technology shocks
zρ 0.94 
Standard deviation of neutral technology shocks
zσ 0.007 
Autocorrelation of investment shocks
qρ 0.89 
Standard deviation of investment shocks
qσ 0.0273 
Note: Neutral Technology Shocks are used in the benchmark and extended 







Table 2.7 : Calibration Results for the Traditional Model  









Coefficient governing employment disutility: skilled
sη 2 
Coefficient governing employment disutility: unskilled
uη 2 
Disutility weight of employment: skilled
sχ 23.1 






Capital share of output kα 0.35 
Coefficient governing substitution elasticity of skilled






Depreciation rate of capital δ 0.025 
Autocorrelation of neutral technology shocks
zρ 0.94 






Table 2.8: Benchmark and Traditional Models -- Volatility and Correlation  
 U.S. Economy 
 
Model 
 1984q1 to 2006q4 Benchmark Model Traditional Model 
 Volatility Correlation Volatility Correlation Volatility Correlation 
GDP 0.0093  1 0.0109 1  0.0103  1  
Consumption 0.0074  0.8222 0.0046 0.9475 0.0034  0.8989  
Investment 0.0426  0.8358 0.0950 0.9745 0.0349  0.9891  
Structures 
Investment 
0.0522  0.5686 0.1014 0.9669 -- -- 
Equipment 
Investment 
0.0432  0.8708 0.1520 0.3115 -- -- 
Employment 0.0077  0.7022 0.0023 0.9758 0.0025  0.9792  
Skilled 
Employment 
0.0108  0.4538 0.0025 0.9690 0.0025  0.9792  
Unskilled 
Employment 
0.0092  0.5948 0.0022 0.9717 0.0025  0.9792  
Skilled Wage 0.0128  0.2831 0.0092 0.9933 0.0079  0.9980  
Unskilled Wage 0.0075  0.2187 0.0086 0.9983 0.0079  0.9980  
 
 
Table 2.9: Benchmark and Traditional Models -- Volatility Ratio 
 U.S. Economy Model 













Table 2.10: Benchmark Model -- Volatility Ratio 
 U.S. Economy The Benchmark Model 
  





















Table 2.11: Benchmark and Extended Models -- Volatility and Correlation 
 U.S. Economy 
 
Model 
 1984q1 to 2006q4 Benchmark Model Extended Model 
 Volatility Correlation Volatility Correlation Volatility Correlation 
GDP 0.0093  1 0.0109 1  0.0110  1  
Consumption 0.0074  0.8222 0.0046 0.9475 0.0047  0.9431  
Investment 0.0426  0.8358 0.0950 0.9745 0.0977  0.9737  
Structures 
Investment 
0.0522  0.5686 0.1014 0.9669 0.1119 0.9278  
Equipment 
Investment 
0.0432  0.8708 0.1520 0.3115 0.3409  0.0932  
Employment 0.0077  0.7022 0.0023 0.9758 0.0023  0.9751  
Skilled 
Employment 
0.0108  0.4538 0.0025 0.9690 0.0029  0.8977  
Unskilled 
Employment 
0.0092  0.5948 0.0022 0.9717 0.0022  0.9617  
Skilled Wage 0.0128  0.2831 0.0092 0.9933 0.0099  0.9712  
Unskilled Wage 0.0075  0.2187 0.0086 0.9983 0.0087  0.9980  
 
 
Table 2.12: Extended Model: Different Shocks 
 U.S. Economy  The Extended Model 
 1984q1 to 2006q4 Two shocks Neutral Shock only Investment Shock only
 Volatility Correlation Volatility Correlation Volatility Correlation Volatility Correlation 
GDP 0.0097  1  0.0110 1  0.0109 1  0.0015  1  
Consumption 0.0080  0.8458  0.0047 0.9431 0.0046 0.9452  0.0005  0.7096  
Investment 0.0419  0.7325  0.0977 0.9737 0.0968 0.9724  0.0166  0.9688  
Structures 
Investment 
0.0574  0.4274  0.1119 0.9278 0.1037 0.9653  0.0420 0.7843  
Equipment 
Investment 
0.0412  0.8090  0.3409 0.0932 0.1499 0.3046  0.2703 -0.5402 
Employment 0.0077  0.6306  0.0023 0.9751 0.0023 0.9744  0.0005  0.9759  
Skilled 
Employment 
0.0108  0.4091  0.0029 0.8977 0.0025 0.9685  0.0015  0.9973 
Unskilled 
Employment 
0.0092  0.5256  0.0022 0.9617 0.0022 0.9703  0.0002  0.8227 
Skilled Wage 0.0128  0.3313  0.0099 0.9712 0.0094 0.9934  0.0033 0.9972  
















Figure 2.1: Relative Demand for Skilled Labor 
 
 
Note: The solid line is the initial relative demand curve of skilled labor. When there is a positive 
technology shock, the increase of capital stock pushes up the demand curve upward. The red 




Figure 2.2: Extended Model: Impulse Responses to a Neutral Technology Shock 


















































Notes: 1 One period is a quarter; 
      2 The unit of the vertical axis is percentage point. All variables are expressed as the 
percentage deviation from their steady state value; 













Figure 2.3: Extended Model: Impulse Responses to an Investment Shock 
















































Notes: 1 One period is a quarter; 
      2 The unit of the vertical axis is percentage point. All variables are expressed as the 
percentage deviation from their steady state value; 










This appendix presents a detailed explanation on how I construct labor market
variables used in this paper. I follow the method of Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008).
A.1 Sample Selection
I restrict attention to individuals who are between 16 and 65 years old, in the
labor force and not self-employed. For individuals who reported being employed, I
eliminate them if they have either zero or missing earnings, or have either zero or
missing values on both “usual hours worked” and “actual hours worked last week”.
I use the weekly usual hours as hours worked for each employee. From 1994 on, if
individuals who have zero or missing usual hours have actual hours of last week, I use
actual hours to represent usual hours. I make this adjustment because individuals
reporting “usual hours vary” are recorded as having missing usual hours since 1994.
A.2 Demographic Subgroups
I divide the sample into 240 demographic groups based on sex, race, age and
education level. First, each individual is either male or female. Second, I restrict
attention to three race categories, namely whites, blacks and others. Thirdly, I
create ten 5-year age groups for people from 16 to 65 years old. Finally, I construct
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four education groups: no high school diploma, or equivalently less than 12 years
of completed schooling; high school graduate, or equivalently 12 years of completed
schooling; between high school and college graduate, or equivalently between 13
and 15 years of completed schooling; college graduate and beyond, or equivalently
16 years of completed schooling or above.
Individuals are classified by their highest grade of school completed. Between
1979 and 1991, individuals report their highest grade of school attended rather than
completed. If one person reported 12 years of education but his/her 12th year of
schooling is still ongoing, I classify this individual as having no high school diploma.
From 1992 on, the BLS education classification switched from years of schooling to
educational categories, which was a consistent transformation and did not cause a
break in the series of education level. I assign education group with college degrees
or above to the skilled category and all the other three education groups to the
unskilled category.
A.3 Aggregation across Demographic Groups
In order to aggregate hours worked across different subgroups, time-invariant
weights for each subgroup are needed. Following Katz and Murphy (1992), KORV
(2000) and Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008), I use the average wage rate of each
subgroup over the whole sample as the weights.
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A.3.1 Aggregate Weights
First, I aggregate monthly data into quarterly series. After sample selection,
each subgroup contains individuals from 1979q1 to 2003q4. Assuming that individ-
uals within each group are perfect substitutes, I calculate the average wage rate for
each group by dividing the total income over the total hours worked:
wg =
∑
i∈g µi ∗ inci∑
i∈g µi ∗ hi
where g is the group index of each demographic group; inci is the individual i’s
real weekly income, which is computed by dividing reported nominal earnings over
the corresponding CPI; hi and µi are, respectively, the individual hours worked and
“earnings weight for all races”.
A.3.2 Hours in Efficiency Units
Based on the wage weights, hours in efficiency units are computed as follows.
For each quarter, I calculate the total usual hours worked for each demographic
group. Then, I use wage weights to aggregate these 240 values and get the hours in











Derivation of Wage Rates Resulting from Nash-Bargaining
First, by definition, we get:



















+ βEtV (t+ 1|t)
}
s.t.
0 = Dt + wstnst + w̃sεs + wutnut + w̃uεu − lscst − lucut







































































The equilibrium wage rate wi solves the weighted geometric average of the
gains from bargaining:







The first-order condition is: 0 = φiJ̃it(·)∂Ṽit∂w̃i + (1− φi)Ṽit(·)
∂J̃it
∂w̃i
From (P.3), I get the following:
Ṽst(ws) = λsc
−σs
st (w̃s − wst) + Vnst
Vnst = −λs(nst)ηs + λsc−σsst wst + β(1− χs − αse
−αs(ls−nst)
vst )EtVnst+1
and Ṽut(wu) = λuc
−σu
ut (w̃u − wut) + Vnut
Vnut = −λu(nut)ηu + λuc−σuut wut + β(1− χu − αue
−αu(nu−nut)
vut )EtVnut+1
From (P.4), I get:






















+ β(1− χu − αue
−αu(lu−nut)
vut )EtΛt,t+1Jnut+1
Now, I solve the Nash-bargaining problem for the skilled wage rate.






∴ 0 = φsλsJnst − (1− φs)cσsst Vnst
When plugging Vnst , I get:













into the above equation and taking some manip-
ulation, I get:








σ−1 + (1− φs)cσsst (nst)ηs
For the unskilled wage rate, I solve it in a parallel way and get the result:












In my paper, I adopt a complete-market structure following Andolfatto (1996).
Here, I show another way to set up the model, which follows Shimer (2009). Time
is discrete, which is denoted by t = 0, 1, 2, · · · . The state of the economy at time
t is denoted by st = {s0, s1, s2, · · · st}, which represents the history of the economy.
Π(st) represents the time-0 belief about the probability of observing a given history







































where a(st) is the household’s assets; and qt(s
t+1) is the time-t price of a unit of con-
























































Expression for Employment Volatility
In this section, I log-linearize the law of motion for employment to derive
an expression for employment volatility. To simplify the notation, I suppress the
type-specific subscript s or u.
Denote the steady state value of variable x by x̄, and denote the percentage
deviation from its steady-state value by x̂. That is, x̂ = x−x̄
x̄







Log-linearizing on the above equation, we get:
















Since l = nt + ut, we have: 0 = n̄n̂t + ūût, or ût =
n̄n̂t
ū
. Replacing ût with
n̄n̂t
ū
in the above equation, we find:








































Finally, we have var(n) = Φ2nnvar(n) + Φ
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